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Summary 
We provide accessible insight into the current ‘replication crisis’ in statistical science, by 
revisiting the metaphor of court trial as hypothesis test. Inter alia, we define and diagnose harmful 
statistical witch-hunting both in justice and science.  
 
Justice is, in principle, a statistical science, and trial as hypothesis test is classic pedagogy. We 
modernize the link here, noting that equivalent errors, and challenges exist in both justice and 
applied statistics. We introduce a severe but applicable metaphor for irresponsible statistical 
inference: statistical witch-hunting – also applying to justice, elevating risk of harming innocents. 
It follows that justice would benefit from further assimilating tools and principles of statistics.  
By riddle: ‘Why do witch-hunters find fewer witches when they bring a statistician with them?’ 
 
The same (and more) can be said of applied statistical science, with its replication crisis. Drawing 
from eminent theoretical and applied statistician Frank Hampel’s “Is statistics too difficult?”1: 
Statistics and its application has led to great advances – e.g., in technology, scientific knowledge, 
and decision-making – forming “a necessary part of our civilization”. As with all technology, 
“statistics also has another, darker side”, with misuse and misunderstanding long being a 
widespread problem: inter alia, corrupting ‘scientific knowledge’ with spurious results. 
 
Good statistical science2, requiring education and experience, is a highly intelligent and creative 
process, for which demand outstrips supply – in academia and industry, which are big, and 
increasingly data-intensive. Most applied statistics is done by researchers within their own 
disciplines. And, by volume, most statistics is not even done by humans, but by data-mining 
machines. Broad use and automation have led to accessible software for routine methods. 
However, routine methods alone are often inadequate for real-world problems3. It has become 
easy to obtain results by simply pushing a button, with virtually no ‘scientific rigor’ necessary. 
 
Under widespread adoption, statistical science struggles to maintain rigor. Serious improvements 
in education, methodology, review, and so on, have been proposed. But ongoing claims to ban p-
values and statistical significance seem radical. Indeed: 1) where p-values are not used properly, 
there will be more serious underlying problems (‘tip of iceberg’), and 2) statistical decisions need 
to be taken: i.e., without them there can be no court verdict, the doctor cannot tell the patient if 
they are sick, and the policy-maker cannot decide if climate change is worthy of action. Those 
pushing ban p-values should consider the risks, especially to practitioners and decision-makers. 
Efforts should be focused on the (hard) root problems causing low quality statistical science – not 
convenient scapegoats. This is key to support the continued productive evolution and 
exploitation of statistical science and technology. For instance, we echo the call of John Tukey, 
made more than 50 years ago, for a more scientific orientation of academic statistics – in 
particular towards a high quality ‘data science’ as outlined by David Donoho4.   
                                                          
1 Hampel, Frank. "Is statistics too difficult?." Canadian Journal of Statistics 26.3 (1998): 497-513. 
2 Requiring, not least, a full understanding of the applicability of the stochastic model/technology, incl. how wrong the model 
approximation of reality is, and the consequences of that error. 
3 As observed by Hampel in his statistical consulting experience. 
4 Donoho, David. "50 years of data science." Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics 26.4 (2017): 745-766. 
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1. Prologue: On witch-hunting & human nature 
             
 
Figure 1. Left: Torturing of a 
witch in Baden, Switzerland 
(1585), by Johann Jakob Wick.  
Right: The burning of a woman 
in Willisau, Switzerland, by 
Diepold Schilling (1447). 
Curiously, in the middle ages, 
the Swiss executed the most 
"witches" per capita in Europe5. 
 
 
There will always be a desire to blame scapegoats for disasters or other misfortunes lacking a 
convenient explanation. In the ‘old days’, abnormal behaviour, or personal motives of an accuser 
could lead to someone being accused of satanic witchcraft, leading to a trial/test. The witch-
hunters had a battery of tests and tortures available, designed to achieve the desired outcome6: 
E.g., 1) Trial by water: If the accused floated when thrown in a river then they were a witch! If they 
were ‘lucky enough’ to sink, then they were innocent. 2) Prayer test: If unable to calmly and 
fluently recite scripture, they were a witch! 3) Marks and pricks: Any physical imperfections, such 
as moles, could be taken as evidence. It was assumed that these marks would be insensitive to 
pain and wouldn’t bleed. Professional “prickers” ran tests – the more mercenary ones using dull 
needles to ensure ‘false positives’.  Despite progress, human nature remains, and we should strive 
to avoid witch-huntings’ more modern manifestations. 
2.   Justice as statistical science: modern parallels 
Striving for real examples to illuminate abstract statistical concepts1 we start with the 
fundamental but often misused NHST7 (null hypothesis significance testing), relating it to a court 
trial, and then exploit a more general analogy. The world of the courtroom and the world of 
statistical science are materially linked by but a few threads. However they share a fundamental 
nature: they both construct hypotheses and test them with evidence. ‘NHST as court trial’ is a 
classic pedagogical example: a test where a guilty verdict is issued if the evidence is sufficiently 
discordant  with the presumption of innocence – further developed in Table 1. 
 
Hypothesis testing Courtroom 
Null hypothesis. Presumption of innocence. 
Reject the null hypothesis. Issue guilty verdict. 
Test level, e.g., p-value<0.05. Standard of proof/‘beyond a reasonable doubt’. 
Test statistic.  Summary of evidence. 
Statistical test.  Jury deliberation and decision. 
Type 1 error / type 2 error. False conviction / false acquittal. 
Prior belief / distribution. E.g., biased jury.  
Invalid test. Mistrial.  
Table 1. Interpretation of the classical analogy8 of hypothesis testing and a criminal trial. Neyman and 
Pearson9 even considered the analogy when pioneering the theory. 
                                                          
5 I. Eichenberger. "No one tortured witches like the Swiss". Swissinfo.ch (14, Sept, 2009) 
6 E. Andrews. "7 Bizarre Witch Trial Tests". History.com (14, Mar, 2014).  
7 E.L Lehmann, and J.P. Romano. Testing statistical hypotheses. Springer Science & Business Media, 2006. 
8 M.A. Martin, (2003). “‘It’s like … you know’: The Use of Analogies and Heuristics in Teaching Introductory Statistical Methods.” The 
Journal of Statistics Education, 11(2) 
9 J. Neyman, and E.S. Pearson. (1933). “On the Problem of the Most Efficient Tests of Statistical Hypotheses.” Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society A, pp. 289-337. 
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To emphasize the gravity and necessity of statistical decisions: In justice, a classic debate exists 
over the optimal stringency of the standard of proof, relating to the moral imperative of harm 
reduction. False convictions exist (type 1 error), but have to be balanced with the risk of false 
acquittals (type 2 error). With no proof required, it would be easy to convict many criminals, but 
also many innocents. With absolute proof required, most criminals would walk free. Statistical 
decision theory allows to determine the optimal level, being equal to the probability of ‘false 
conviction’: e.g., with level 0.05, independently repeating trial of an innocent, one expects false 
conviction 5% of the time. Legal scholars have lamented the unknowability of the false conviction 
rate. But, with statistics, it was estimated as 4.3%10 for ‘death row, USA’ – a ‘cosmic coincidence’ 
that the court has self-organized towards the 5% level – a ‘default’ in many fields. 
In 2004, an American professor of law and justice prefaced his book with a comment on the 
immature state of statistics in justice: “…we have a coherent sophisticated, effective framework 
managing errors in statistical inference, but no such framework in the criminal justice system”11. 
However, the commonality between a court trial and ‘statistical science’ in practice becomes 
clearer when extending the analogy (see table 2): the familiar courtroom terms make their 
statistical counterparts immediately understandable. In brief, any criminal trial is far more 
complicated than a simple hypothesis test, however the same is true of any scientific study.  
 
Statistical science Courtroom/Justice 
Faulty experimental design. Flawed investigation/evidence discovery. 
Data manipulation/selection. Evidence tampering. 
Data-snooping: Selecting test after seeing data. Selecting the charge after knowing jury/evidence. 
Selecting the test that confirms your hypothesis. Jury rigging, or worse: higher level corruption. 
‘Guilty until proven innocent’. 
Witch-hunting: Multiple testing and data-mining. Witch-hunting: ‘trial until guilty’. 
Journal editors, review committee. Judge, appel courts, etc. 
Moral hazard: Pressure in pharmaceutical trials to 
rush the product to market; political bias in social 
sciences; cheating for career advancement, etc. 
Moral hazard: Political bias, commercial interests, 
money, and so on irrefutably influence the 
outcome of trials. 
False discovery published: Spurious publications 
may be long-lived12, being both used and cited, as 
contradictory negative findings are seldom 
published, and published works seldom retracted. 
False precedent: Errors accepted into common law 
may propagate far, causing harmful decisions, due 
to principle ‘stare decisis’ to abide by precedent and 
not disturb settled matters. 
Study rejected/retracted (e.g., by journal). Verdict overturned/appeal. 
Ongoing replication crisis, where published 
significant results cannot be reproduced; in some 
fields in the majority of cases.13 
Scenario of irresponsible mis-use of justice, leading 
to many innocents being convicted, and loss of 
confidence in the judicial authority & process. 
Table 2. A modern analogy of applied statistical sciences and the criminal justice process in terms of mis-
uses and errors. The final row is a summary issue, to which all the other mis-uses/abuses may contribute. 
  
                                                          
10 S.R. Gross, et al. "Rate of false conviction of criminal defendants who are sentenced to death." Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences 111.20 (2014): 7230-7235. 
11 B. Forst. “Errors of justice: Nature, sources and remedies. Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
12 K. Cor and G. Sood, 2019 find that about 30% of positive citations to retracted articles occur in the year following their retraction 
("Propagation of Error: Approving Citations to Problematic Research": http://www.gsood.com/research/papers/error.pdf) 
13 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Replication_crisis ; Harris, Richard. Rigor mortis: how sloppy science creates worthless cures, crushes 
hope, and wastes billions. Basic Books, 2017. 
 4 
Further, the justice world deals with a number of challenges that pervade statistical science: 
- Communicating statistical evidence to non-expert decision-makers (e.g., communication 
of uncertain risk information to politicians, like uncertain evidence to the jury). 
- Quantification of belief (e.g., through subjective probabilities). 
- Drawing conclusions from diverse/complex evidence (e.g., with Bayesian networks: 
graphical models of probabilistic relationships between hypotheses and evidence).14,15  
- Lack of important data due to sensitivity/confidentiality. 
- Handling human cognitive errors (e.g., jurors,  investors, or power plant operators). 
- Differentiating between statistically significant and practically meaningful results16. 
Indeed, the esoteric field of forensic statistics focuses on statistics in the justice system. According 
to Prof. Colin Aitken: The field is small, with work – e.g., supporting analyses and providing expert 
witness –  done by academics and others on a consulting basis.17 Despite the clear importance of 
the field, the small community faces a battle against courts that resist adoption of statistical 
sciences.18 Nevertheless, foundational work has been done and is ongoing.19,20   
 
3. Statistical witchhunts in justice 
To borrow a quote from Prof. Norman Fenton, “Proper use of probabilistic reasoning has the 
potential to improve the efficiency, transparency and fairness of the criminal justice system .” 
We now exploit statistical principles to support better justice. To start, in every court trial – and 
interactions with authority, under the risk of undeserved harm21 – the judicial system plays 
‘Russian roulette’ with the freedom, livelihood, and reputation of the accused. Indeed one can 
argue that any time a person is put on trial and found not guilty, they should be compensated – 
e.g., on a pure risk basis, 0.05 times the ‘cost’ associated with a false conviction. And, if determined 
to be based on a false accusation, the malicious accuser should pay (at least) that. 
Next, consider the multiple testing problem22 of modern statistics: If a statistical experiment is 
repeated enough times, eventually (by chance) a false significant result will be found. It is 
plausible that this ‘false-conviction’ error underlies many of the scientific studies that cannot be 
reproduced. E.g., American drug company, Amgen, tried to reproduce the successes of 53 
‘landmark’ cancer papers, but recovered a mere 11% of the results23.  A prevalent manifestation 
of multiple testing, especially in finance, is that, e.g., given a big set of unrelated time series, sets 
of ‘significantly correlated’ series will be spuriously identified. E.g., a portfolio manager “sifted 
through a United Nations CD‐ROM and discovered that historically, the single best prediction of 
the Standard & Poor's 500 stock index was butter production in Bangladesh.”24 As a joke, he 
published the finding. People still earnestly contact him to exploit this miraculous correlation.  
                                                          
14 Y. McDermott, and C.G. Aitken. "Analysis of evidence in international criminal trials using Bayesian Belief Networks." Law, 
Probability and Risk 16.2-3 (2017): 111-129  
15 F. Taroni, C.G.G Aitken, P. Garbolino, & A. Biedermann. (2006). Bayesian networks and probabilistic inference in forensic science 
(p. 372). Chichester: Wiley. 
16 C.G. Aitken, A. Wilson, and R. Sleeman. "Statistical significance—meaningful or not." Law, Probability and Risk (2018) 
17 https://www.statslife.org.uk/careers/profiles/1135-colin-aitken-forensic-statistician 
18 N. Fenton. "Science and law: Improve statistics in court." Nature 479.7371 (2011): 36. 
19 C.G.G Aitken, and F. Taroni. "Fundamentals of statistical evidence—a primer for legal professionals." The International Journal of 
Evidence & Proof 12.3 (2008): 181-207. 
20 D.A. Schum. The evidential foundations of probabilistic reasoning. Northwestern University Press, 2001. 
21 ‘Stop and frisk’, or police raids provide salient examples. 
22 P.C O'Brien, and T.R. Fleming. "A multiple testing procedure for clinical trials." Biometrics (1979): 549-556. 
23 M. Baker. "Biotech giant publishes failures to confirm high-profile science", Nature 530, 141 (2016). 
24 R. Sullivan, et. al. "Data-Snooping, Technical Trading Rule Performance, and the Bootstrap", The Journal of Finance 54 (5)(1999) 
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The manifestation of multiple testing in justice is clear: If running multiple trials for the same 
crime, or against the same person, an appropriately higher burden of proof (e.g., Bonferroni 
correction25) should be required in each of the individual trials to avoid the probability of a false 
conviction from mushrooming. Ignoring these basic statistical principles, a judicial witchhunt 
could apply “trial until guilty” – a complete abuse of justice that tortures the presumption of 
innocence until it collapses.  
So, if going on a witch-hunt – in the name of science or justice – please bring a good statistician 
along with you. You may be disappointed with the catch, but there is a good chance that less harm 
will be done. 
 
4. The crisis of statistical science: witch-hunters turn on their own wares? 
Next, is statistical science – with a dominant share done by ‘non-statisticians’, or even data-mining 
machines – in worse shape than justice? ‘The field’, which is extremely diverse, is in crisis, having 
a false positive rate of publications many-fold-higher than the 4.3% false conviction rate on US 
death row. But what are the authorities saying? First, looking to the American Statistical 
Association (ASA): In 2016, the ASA issued guidelines on use of p-values.26 The basic idea was 
that one should not rely on p-values alone – i.e., neglecting all other relevant information such as 
sample size27, quality of model and study, and size of estimated effect. In effect, this is an 
injunction for a minimal level of rigor, due to an observed deficit in practice. Serious and 
substantial literature followed.  
In March, 2019, the ASA pushes further ‘reforms’ via editorial, entitled, “Moving to a World Beyond 
p < 0.05”. It concluded “based on our review […] it is time to stop using the term “statistically 
significant” entirely. Nor should variants […] survive.” Assessing the state of statistical science as 
“old, rotting timbers”, they discuss important issues such as best practices, as well as institutional 
reform. Remedial prescriptions such as “accept uncertainty", "be open, and modest” and do 
“thoughtful science", again simply discuss basic rigor, although without reference to standard 
philosophy of science. But, their focus and conclusions target use of p-values: finishing on a 
revolutionary note, "Let’s move beyond “statistically significant,” even if upheaval and disruption 
are inevitable […] It’s worth it […] by breaking free from the bonds of statistical significance, 
statistics in science and policy will become more significant than ever. " 
Next, from the prestigious journal "Nature"28: “We agree and call for the entire concept of 
statistical significance to be abandoned.” This is then apparently contradicted with, "We are not 
advocating a ban on P values, confidence intervals or other statistical measures", and finally "Our 
call to retire statistical significance and to use confidence intervals as compatibility intervals is not 
a panacea. Although it will eliminate many bad practices, it could well introduce new ones." The 
journal followed up with an editorial "It’s time to talk about ditching statistical significance"29. 
Apparently more than 850 ‘scientists’ have endorsed the article in the online commentary facility. 
                                                          
25 Dunn, Olive Jean. "Multiple comparisons among means." Journal of the American statistical association 56.293 (1961) 
26 R.L. Wasserstein, and N.A. Lazar. "The ASA’s statement on p-values: context, process, and purpose." The American Statistician 70.2 
(2016): 129-133. 
27 E,g., debated between: P. Vermeesch. (2009), Lies, Damned lies and statistics (in geology),  EOS 90 (47), 443 (2009) , and D. 
Sornette  and V. Pisarenko, On the Correct Use of Statistical Tests: Reply to “Lies, damned lies and statistics (in Geology)”, Eos 
Transactions AGU, Vol. 92, No. 8, p. 64 (22 February 2011) 
28 V. Amrhein, S. Greenland, and B. McShane, "Scientists rise up against statistical significance". Nature 567, 305-307 (2019)  
29 "It’s time to talk about ditching statistical significance", Nature 567, 283 (2019) 
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Behind the smoke, is there fire? Indeed, and no less than a lack of quality in scientific work. Good 
science requires rigor across its full lifecycle. Peng and Leek made this point, loud and clear, with 
"p-values are just the tip of the iceberg"30.  Indeed and furthermore, studies must be consistently 
assimilated with the body of literature, and truth elevated. This goes beyond technology, 
involving system design, philosophy, education and human behavior—there is no panacaea to 
ensure ‘good science’. We can be open to paradigm shift31 in statistical science, but disruptive 
revolution should be used with great care and only when truly needed. Appropriately, serious 
remedial actions have been proposed: encouraging replication studies, publication of negative 
findings, open data, new statistical tools, and so on. From here, ‘burning p-values at the stake’ 
looks a bit like reactive scapegoating, whereas focusing on the (hard) root problems will be the 
way to support the continued productive evolution and exploitation of statistics in science and 
beyond.  
We conclude by considering the experience of the Catholic church -- under which much of western 
science took place, especially before the printing press32. In particular, from Pope Paul VI: 
 
“ …from some fissure the smoke of Satan has entered the temple of God.  There is doubt, incertitude, 
problematic, disquiet, dissatisfaction, confrontation.  There is no longer trust of the Church; they 
trust the first profane prophet who speaks in some journal or some social movement, and they run 
after him and ask him if he has the formula of true life.  And we are not alert to the fact that we are 
already the owners and masters of the formula of true life.  Doubt has entered our consciences, and 
it entered by windows that should have been open to the light.  Science exists to give us truths that 
do not separate from God, but make us seek him all the more and celebrate him with greater 
intensity; instead, science gives us criticism and doubt.  Scientists are those who more thoughtfully 
and more painfully exert their minds.  But they end up teaching us:  “I don’t know, we don’t know, 
we cannot know.”  The school becomes the gymnasium of confusion and sometimes of absurd 
contradictions.  Progress is celebrated, only so that it can then be demolished with revolutions that 
are more radical and more strange, so as to negate everything that has been achieved, and to come 
away as primitives after having so exalted the advances of the modern world." – Pope Paul VI, 
197233   
                                                          
30 J.T. Leek, and R.D. Peng. "Statistics: P values are just the tip of the iceberg." Nature News 520.7549 (2015): 612. 
31 T.S. Kuhn. The structure of scientific revolutions. University of Chicago press, 2012. 
32 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catholic_Church_and_science 
33 Pope Paul VI, “Mass on the 9th anniversary of the crowning of His Holiness Paul VI on the Solemnity of the Apostles Peter and 
Paul”, 29 June 1972, https://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/homilies/1972.index.html 
